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TWO VIEWS OF ART 
Stephen Cross 
In the course of the _Present century, many different theories of what art is 
and how art functions have been put forward . They often throw an 
interesting light on a particular aspect of the question, but nearly all of them 
fail to provide a convincing, broad definition of art, such as we need in the 
actual business of living our lives and giving art a place in them. 
So what I want to put before you is two views of art which seem to me 
to be, in an important respect, different from most of the others. What 
distinguishes them is that they are not simply academic theories, however 
interesting these might be, but that they have been the way in which art has 
in practice been understood and grasped by great numbers of people, by 
whole cultures - the way in which, within these, art has for a time been 
almost universally understood. 
Both of these views remain, at least in part, current today, and it is 
their coming together, or, as we shall see, their confusion, which makes up 
our contemporary view of art. !f we can see the difference between them, 
and understand how they have come to be confused and what the effect of 
this has been, then I think that some of the obscurities which have collected 
round questions to do with art will start to be dispelled. 
Let us begin by forgetting for the moment our contemporary ideas about art 
and recalling the view of many - indeed most - of the great cultures of the 
past. We find in these societies a single view which, although it now seems 
strange and sup rising to many, has been that of the great majority of 
mankind for by far the greater part of time. This is the view of art which was 
held in medieval Europe and the. ancient world, by Plato, Plotinus, and 
Dante- and indeed by a twentieth century poet such as Yeats; which is found 
in old Chinese, Hindu and Buddhist sources; and which continues to be 
held by many traditional peoples throughout the world. It can therefore lay 
claim to being a norm, a universal and perennial philosophy of art, which 
has been progressively forgotten in the West as the modern world has come 
into being. I will call it the traditional view. 
In exploring it we might start with the related questions of originality 
and genius. From the standpoint of traditional art, the value which is now 
placed upon originality is an error. Although it at first acted as a stimulus, it 
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has at length produced a fragmentation and dispersal which we can see very 
clearly in twentieth-century pa inting. Originating in the humanism of the 
and boosted by Romantic individ ualism, it is the equivalent in 
the arts of the idea of Progress. It is the inversion of the traditional attitude, 
which has always been to look for guidance towards the universal 
experience of mankind and to the great figures of the past, sometimes 
collectively symbolised as the Golden Age. 
On this view of art, the truly creative artist is not he who is original, in 
the sense of inventing his own imagery. Rather, the truly creative artist is 
he who, in St. Augustine's words, 'sees within what he has to do without'.! 
That is to say, he does not simply copy a traditional image, but works from 
his own inward vision of it. That this should be alive for him, and that he 
should be true to it, is what matters. The image he represents - a seated 
Buddha perhaps, a Christ in Majesty· is one common to all who live within 
the same culture, but now, and herein lies the true originality, crystallised 
anew in the artist. 
For example, the detailed descriptions of gods we find in the old Hindu 
artistic manuals, the Silpa-sastras, are not direct instructions for making the 
representations. They are there to assist the full achievement of an Interior 
vision of the deity, and it is this li ving vision, the result of contemplation, 
which is then translated into the work of art. The artist's objective is identity 
of consciousness with the archetype, and it is out of this that his work 
comes.2 If, as frequently happens, the result is close to that of another artist, 
that, far from being a criticism, merely confirms the rightness of his vision. 
'The value of uniformity for the development of styles', wrote Jacob 
Burckhardt, 'is incalculable. It challenges art to remain eternally youthful 
and fresh within the circles of ancient themes, yet at the same time 
monumental and adequate to the sanctuary'.3 The arts, he adds, are 'the 
outward image of inward things,' and therefore a form of revelation.4 
The artist conforms himself to the idea which he will represent; he 
enters into it and becomes one with it, understands its meaning, lives it 
inwardly . In this way his activity is a matter not of thought, but of 
contemplation. The traditional Indian actor prepares for his performance by 
prayer. The Indian architect is spoken of as visiting heaven and imitating 
the forms he sees there.s Nor is there anything strange about this. It is from 
the supra-individual life of the artist himself, as opposed to his personality 
or individual self, that the vitality of the work is derived. The idea of the 
thing to be made is not invented by the artist, but found and brought to life 
within him. The model is not extrinsic to himself; hence, even when his 
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work conforms closely to an iconographic type, his freedom is unimpaired. 
After the vision, the physical work proceeds: he makes, as A. K. 
Coomaraswamy has said, 'what was shown him upon the Mount'.6 
It follows, for this theory of art, that what is called 'genius' is not, as 
many have come to suppose, the exploitation of an exceptionally developed 
individuality. It is, on the contrary, the appearance and action of the non-
individual, the daimon, the immanent spirit, in the artist. Inspiration is not 
the uprush of an instinctive and subconscious will. It is precisely the leaving 
of the will, and the elevation of the artist's being to the supraindividual 
level: 'I am one,' declared Dante, 'who when Love inspires me takes note, 
and go setting it forth in such wise as He dictates within me'.7 And a 
modern painter, Mondrian, has written: 
the universal although its germ is already in us towers far above us; and just as far 
above us is that art which directly expresses the universal... Through our intuition the 
universal in us can become so active ... that ... it pushes aside our individuality. Then art 
can reveal itself.B 
This is the secret of genius. 
Although this is an intensely personal process, it is also a communal 
one. The image which an artist in a traditional society brings to life within 
himself is not a private one, but a communal and collective one: others can 
relate to it in the same way as he did. Thus one way of defining genius is as 
that quality which identifies more deeply with, and penetrates further into, 
the collective images of a culture, and so renews or extends their meaning. 
This is where the modern artist, particularly the visual artist, suffers 
his most crippling disadvantage. He too, like Mondrian -or like Rothko and 
many others - may follow the same process of turning inwards, but unless 
he is able to draw on the vital collective imagery of a culture, his visions, 
however inspired, will remain private. Perhaps, if he is fortunate, the 
meaning of his imagery will become known to a few connoisseurs; even, in 
time, to a small educated public. But it can never speak to a whole people, to 
an entire civilisation, with the splendour and authority of a traditional 
image. 
This, then, in outline, is the first of our two views what we have called 
the traditional view of art. Art is a means which opens for us realms of 
experience and understanding not otherwise available; realities which lie 
behind the surface of human life, and the substance of which we cannot 
otherwise grasp. It opens to us a fuller consciousness. It is thus supremely 
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valuable. What falls below this level is not worthy of the name of art. 
It will be seen at once that, even though elements of it survive, this is not 
now a generally current view of art, and that it is one which can prevail 
only in a society in which contemplation is accorded a central role. 
But let us pass now to the second view of art I want to consider. This 
results in an altogether broader interpretation. Tolstoy describes it as 
follows: 'To evoke in oneself a feeling one has once experienced and, having 
evoked it in oneself, then by means of movements, lines, colours, sounds or 
forms expressed in words, so to transmit that feeling that others experience 
the same feeling - this is the activity of art'.9 In short, art is that which 
communicates emotion. While it may also convey ideas or simply 
information, that is incidental : what makes it art is the fact that it recreates 
in the spectator a certain emotion experienced by the artist. 
Thus a painting which merely conveys ideas, but not emotion for 
example, some of the Neo-classical work of the eighteenth century, as it now 
appears to us - is cold and dead. It does not succeed as art. Or again, if we are 
engaged in writing, the moment we wish to convey an emotion to the 
reader, to move him, to make him feel with us, we have recourse to the 
devices of art - to simile, metaphor, contrasts, patterns of rhythm, and the 
rest. Nor does it matter in the least what emotions are conveyed. They may 
be pleasing or painful, elevating or depressing: whether it is a work by Fra 
Angelico or Francis Bacon, so long as it communicates emotion from one 
human being to another, it is art. 
Much more than the traditional view, this second way of 
understanding art immediately strikes a chord in us, for it is the one which 
prevails today. We now define art almost exclusively in this broader way. 
Moreover, it is an entirely valid definition. Even traditional art, as we have 
described it, must and does conform to it: the symbolism it employs, the 
inward vision and knowledge it conveys, these must always come to us in a 
form that moves us, or it fails as art. And we may note in passing that it is 
here that the distinction between art and craft may lie. Many finely-made 
objects give expression, in their form or decoration, to traditional 
symbolism, and in this way transmit knowledge, even esoteric knowledge, 
just as does traditional art - yet we do not recognise them as works of art 
unless they also have the property of moving us. 
Art, then, on this second view, is the means by which human beings 
communicate emotions to one another, and in this way it can change us and 
may at times promote human sympathy and understanding. As in language 
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we have a common heritage of human thought, Tolstoy argued, so in art we 
have a common heritage of human feeling. Art is the language of emotion, 
the means by which it is transmitted across time and space.lO 
These, then, are the two views of art I want to put before you. Each is valid 
on its own terms. But we should not, of course, think that they define the 
same thing, or that the word 'art' carries the same meaning in the two cases. 
Whereas the first is an exacting definition which ultimately relates art to 
contemplation, the second is the broadest possible definition. It represents 
the lowest common denominator by means of which art may be defined. 
Many contemporary confusions about art arise because this distinction 
is not observed. It is not sufficiently realised that Western culture has 
shifted, more or less unconsciously, from the first, more demanding 
definition of art to the second and much broader one. The shift in itself is 
perfectly legitimate, though we may think it indicative of a certain lack of 
aspiration. What is not legitimate is that we have contrived to retain the 
prestige - the implication of high purpose and ultimate value - which 
belonged to the more demanding definition of art, and attach it to the 
second, much broader one, that which defines art by its lowest common 
denominator. 
A moment's thought reveals that this is merely semantic legerdemain, 
and that the word 'art' in the two definitions does not carry the same value. 
Only if we adopt the traditional view can we say that art is always a good. On 
that view, it is so by definition for its function is to heighten our 
consciousness and assist the development of our inward being: 'The whole 
work was undertaken,' wrote Dante of the Divine Comedy, 'not for a 
speculative but a practical end ... to remove those who are living in this life 
from the state of wretchedness and to lead them to the state of 
blessedness' .11 
But if, on the other hand, we adopt the second and broader definition 
of art a different set of consequences results. On this definition art retains 
much less inherent value . It is the means by which human beings 
communicate emotions to one another, and in this way it can change us and 
may at times promote human sympathy and understanding. While this has 
a certain value, there is no guarantee that the change is necessarily for the 
better. Emotions may be either ennobling or destructive, they may refine or 
blunt our sensibility, and accordingly art, when defined in this manner - and 
no matter how excellent it may be qua art; that is, how effectively or subtly it 
conveys the emotions in question may be either beneficial or harmful. 
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Coomaraswamy has put it as follows: the poet or painter's task as an 
artist is to express what he has to tell us as perfectly as possible. His task as a 
person is to choose well what it is that he expresses. This latter is an ethical, 
not an artistic, judgement. The two spheres are not to be confused. A work 
can be at the same time admirable as art, but ethically and socially disastrous 
-we may think, for example, of certain films produced in Nazi Germany or 
Soviet Russia . Thus, Coomaraswamy tells us, Confucius speaks of the 
Succession Dance as being 'at the same time perfect beauty and perfect 
goodness', but of the War Dance as being 'perfect beauty, but not perfect 
goodness' ,12 
The one sphere does not validate the other. Neither does the ethically 
valuable become for that reason significant art - that of course was the great 
fallacy of the Victorian age; nor does the artistically accomplished become 
for that reason ethically and socially valuable - that is our own 
contemporary fallacy and misunderstanding. To confuse the two, as we 
have done for almost two centuries, is destructive in both spheres. 
Tolstoy tells us the same thing with absolute clarity: we must separate 
what is valuable in art from what is not; the 'real, important, necessary 
spiritual food,' as he puts it, from harmful or useless art. Art which is good 
as art, may be morally and spiritually bad.13 
But this, of course, is just what we are unwilling to admit. Why should 
we feel this reluctance? We are reluctant to admit it, I suggest, because 
unconsciously we remain influenced by the traditional view of art according 
to which, as we have seen, art is always and by definition a good. 
It seems, then, that what we habitually do, without being aware of it, is 
to mix together the two views of art I have outlined. We define art 
according to the second and broader view: art is that which communicates 
emotion. But we do not draw the conclusions with regard to value which 
follow from this . Instead we continue to attach a higher, indeed a mystical 
value to art, which derives from the first view, the traditional view. The 
result, of course, is confusion. The definition and the value do not balance; 
they belong to different worlds of thought. 
It is as a residue from the traditional understanding that art continues 
to enjoy its tremendous prestige. But the idea of art from which that prestige 
derives is no longer accepted or understood. In this way art becomes a kind 
of superstition something which 'stands over' from a past view, the 
significance of which has been forgotten. 'Art and poetry themselves are in 
our day,' wrote Burckhardt, well over a century ago, 'in the most wretched 
plight, for they have no spiritual home.'14 
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And about the same time, Nietzsche, in speaking of the 'death of God' 
which had taken place in the West, predicted that the process of cultural 
destruction which would follow would be slow, lengthy and vast, for the 
implications were so great that it would be many decades, if not centuries, 
before people understood how much of civilisation and culture they had 
lost.15 Our present attitude to art exemplifies this. Having set aside, along 
with God, the traditional, religiously-based understanding of art, it appears 
that we still cling in desperation to the values which rest upon it. 
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